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1. INTRODUCTION
An enormous change has occurred in accounting research since I first came to this country in 1966. This
change is well illustrated by the difference in the composition of the participants at the first Chicago
Annual Conference on Empirical Research I attended (1967) and the most recent Accounting
Conference I attended at the University of Chicago, the 1982 Conference on Current Research
Methodologies in Accounting. The first conference included the Managing Director of the AICPA
among those presenting papers and among the discussants, three accounting practitioners, two finance
practitioners, one economist and one behavioral scientist. The most recent conference included a well
known economist and a well known behavioral scientist among those giving papers and three top
financial economists and a behavioral scientist as discussants. Further, several well known economists
even paid their own expenses to attend the Conference (including my own colleague Bill Schwert). No
practitioners (finance or accounting) appeared on the program in 1982. (1)
Accounting research has attained a degree of academic respectability among economists far greater than
I would have thought possible in 1967. But, at the same time it has become more removed from the
practitioner. What are the reasons for those changes? First, accounting research has become much more
scientific; more rigorous and sophisticated in its analysis and empirical work. This has gained the
respect of economists, but at the same time it has made it much more difficult for practitioners to read
and understand the literature. (2) Second, the topics addressed by accounting researchers are very
important to the economists' new found interest in the theory of the firm. This has attracted the interest
of the economist, but the result of this recent shift in topics has not yet begun to be translated for
professional consumption. Practitioners are still confronted with the view that the EMH implies that if
accounting procedures do not affect taxes they do not affect stock prices. (3)
The application of scientific methodology to interesting accounting topics has not only gained the
respect of economists, it has produced some robust empirical results which were previously unknown
(to me at least). An example is the result that the higher the leverage of a firm the more likely it is to use
accounting procedures which increase the present value of reported earnings. Such results, together with
the insights produced by the analysis, suggest that the current thrust of economics-based accounting
research will provide a better explanation for accounting practice. If it does, I expect practitioners to be
more actively involved in the accounting research process.
The economics-based empirically-oriented research literature which attracted top economists to the
1982 Chicago Conference did not emerge full blown, it was an evolutionary process. The process
followed naturally not only from the greater training accounting researchers received in the discipline of
economics, but also (from the mid-60's on) from those researchers' exposure to the oral empirical
tradition, to the research methods used in science.
This exposure to the research methods of science came not from formal courses in scientific method,
but from exposure to numerous workshops where empirical studies in finance and economics were
criticized and from the advice of experienced empirical researchers. However, I would hasten to add
that as the area has matured, or better, perhaps, as some of us have grown old, accounting empiricists
have read the philosophy of science literature. That is appropriate in my opinion because an
understanding of that literature is difficult unless one has had experience of empirical work.
The objective of this talk is to trace the evolution of economics-based empirical research in accounting
and to relate it to the oral tradition, as I perceive it, and to developments in financial economics. An
understanding of this evolutionary process is important to the practitioner who wants to understand the
empirical literature in accounting. It is crucial to the accounting student who aspires to become a
successful researcher. An understanding of the process enables the researcher to identify and pursue
important new research topics, rather than replicate the studies of others.
Before I trace the evolution of the empirical work and relate it to the oral tradition, let me give a brief
outline of my view of theory under the oral tradition.
2. THE NATURE OF THEORY
a) Objective of theory.
Under the oral tradition a theory is designed to:
i) explain associations between observable variables, for example between firms'
debt/equity ratios and their use of straight-line or accelerated depreciation. Such
explanations allow one to attach causality to a variable (e.g., that differences in debt/equity
ratios cause differences in depreciation methods);
ii) provide predictions about relationships not yet observed. For example, before
investigating and observing stock prices, some researchers predict based on their theory
that a change to straight-line depreciation, per se, does not affect stock prices because it
does not affect the firm's cash flows.
A theory of accounting should explain why different firms and industries use different accounting
procedures. For example, it should explain why firms in the mining and construction industry recognize
profit at production and other firms recognize profit at sale. Further, it should enable one to predict
which procedures firms with particular characteristics will use.
b) Importance of theory
The corporate manager trying to be successful in his own career often has to make accounting decisions,
for example, the choice between accelerated and straight-line depreciation. In making those decisions,
the manager would like to know the effect of his choice on his career. He wants to know the answer to
what if questions. If he chooses accelerated depreciation what is its effect on the firm's cash flows, its
stock price and his own welfare. The manager will have his own ideas about those effects and will make
decisions on the basis of those ideas. However, if a theory is produced which "better" predicts and
explains the effects than his own implicit theory, he will tend to use the new theory. If he doesn't, he
will tend to be surpassed by managers who do use the new theory. So "better" theories are important to
the manager.
The public accountant would also like to know the effect of accounting decisions such as the choice of
accelerated or straight-line depreciation. If he is to recommend the method to a client he would like to
know the effects of the method on the client and himself.
Those who would demand accounting theories include lending officers of financial institutions,
financial analysts, investors and those who regulate accounting and promulgate accounting standards. I
think the FASB members would have liked to be able to predict the reaction to FASB Statement number
8.
c) The success of theories
How do researchers determine which are the "best" theories? A simple answer to this question is that in
the long term the researchers do not have the choice, the users will determine which theories are
successful.
Users of theories will not wait for a perfect theory (i.e., one which predicts and explains every
observation). They will choose the one out of the available imperfect set which is best for them. For
example, suppose a given model of bankruptcy predicts a firm will go bankrupt within a year and there
is substantial evidence that model's predictions are right 95 percent of the time. Would a lending officer
who, before learning of the model's prediction, predicted a probability of bankruptcy of .01, ignore the
model's prediction of bankruptcy? No. He'll use the model if it is more accurate than his own
predictions and weigh the expected costs of type I and type II errors in making his investment decision.
The successful theory is the one which is most useful to users. As Popper (1959, p. 108) writes: "We
choose the theory which best holds its own in competition with other theories; the one which, by natural
selection, proves itself the fittest to survive." This suggests that there is no natural significance level for
hypothesis testing such as the commonly used five or 10 percent. If there are no better theories available
20 percent could be acceptable. The choice is always between imperfect theories or between an
imperfect theory and no theory at all.
The acceptance of imperfect theories by users is not unique to the social sciences. For example,
Newtonian physics are still used for many purposes. And, theories of aerodynamics were used despite
the fact that until recently they predicted that the bumble bee would not fly. The issue is one of costs
versus benefits to the user.
d) Role of a Meory's assumptions
In developing a theory researchers make assumptions, define variables and then use logic (including
mathematics) to derive relationships between variables. Finally, substantive hypotheses are derived for
empirical testing. Of necessity assumptions are not completely realistic. Theories try to generalize
across more than one observation, so they abstract from certain characteristics of variables and
concentrate on others. In choosing assumptions the researcher tries to capture the essence of the
Phenomena. For example, the assumptions of perfect competition while not perfectly descriptive may
capture the essence of the competition among a large number of traders in the commodities markets and
as a result produce a theory which has substantial predictive and explanatory power for many purposes.
Because of their abstractions, all our theories in economics and accounting will not explain every
observation. We will always be able to find contrary examples. This is something non-empiricists and
practitioners find very hard to understand.
Assumptions are very important in developing a theory. Contrary to Friedman (1953) we do not have to
worry as to how descriptive they are because that will affect their ability to predict and explain
phenomena.
e) Role of mathematics
The use of mathematics, per se, is not a criterion in determining the success of a theory. Mathematics is
one way of applying logic to the assumptions and definitions to derive propositions. An important
criterion in choosing among theories is simplicity. If a point can be made without complex mathematics
it should be made in that fashion. Complexity, per se, is "bad" because it imposes costs on the user of a
theory. Unless the complexity provides additional insights or testable propositions it should not be
employed. This point is frequently overlooked by our colleagues involved in model building.
f) Relationship between theory and normative propositions
Over the years accounting research has been driven by the desire to make normative propositions, to
answer the question, what accounting method should be used? Pressures have been put on the SEC, the
CAP, the APB and the FASB to reduce the diversity of accounting procedures and this led the
researchers of those bodies to seek guidance from accounting researchers as to what procedures should
be allowed. Likewise as indicated previously, corporate managers also seek the answer as to what
procedure should they use.
As accounting researchers have come to recognize (see Beaver and Demski), theory alone cannot
answer these questions. In order for the theorist to answer his question, the user (FASB or manager) has
to specify the objective function. This makes the question a "what if" type and theory can be used. If the
manager specifies the objective as maximizing the value of the firm, an accounting theory which
explains the effect of accounting methods on stock prices can provide an answer. The "what if" question
is testable and evidence can be applied.
Having briefly outlined some aspects of theory as I see it viewed in the oral tradition, let me now turn to
the evolution of empirical research based on economics.
3. THE EVOLUTION OF EMPIRICAL RESEARCH
Accounting research has always tended to borrow from economics rather than lend to economics and
the beginning of economics-based empirical research in accounting is no different. There were a
smattering of economics-based empirical studies appearing in the mid-60's on income smoothing
(Gordon, Horowitz and Meyers, 1966) and on financial distress prediction (Beaver, 1966) and even one
on the relationship between earnings and stock prices (Benston, 1967) but the paper which generated
accounting researchers' interest in empirical work based on financial economics was Ball and Brown
(1968). A recent informal survey of leading accounting academics by Dyckman and Zeff (1983) found
that Ball and Brown was cited as one of the most important contributions to accounting in the last two
decades more often than any other article. In fact, it received more than twice as many votes as its
nearest competitor.
The Ball and Brown paper led to an outpouring of economics-based empirical work in accounting. The
paper was originally rejected by the Accounting Review because it was not an accounting manuscript.
Hence, it was accepted by the Journal of Accounting Research (see Dyckman and Zeff, 1982, p. 22) and
the flood of research which followed helped carry the JAR to prominence as the leading academic
accounting journal. In fact, I suspect the JAR played an important innovative role in developing
empirical research.
Given the role of the Ball and Brown paper in generating research it is instructive to evaluate the paper
in terms of the oral tradition on the evolution of research.
a) Ball and Brown (1968)
In the 1960's most of the papers published in the Accounting Review or the JAR were what Dyckman
and Zeff (1983) call "a priori" research. They were concerned with arguing for or against particular
accounting procedures. The best of these papers assumed an objective function, assumed that certain
hypotheses about the use of accounting data and other phenomena were correct and attempted to
logically derive which methods would maximize the objective function. Of course, given their objective
function and that their logic is correct, the prescriptions of these papers (e.g., current value accounting)
are only as good as the weakest of the hypotheses underlying them. If one hypothesis is not descriptive,
the prescriptions would not achieve the objective.
From the early to mid-60's on some Ph.D. programs placed emphasis on finance and economics training
for their accountants. Ball and Brown recognized from their finance training that many of the "a priori"
papers relied on an hypothesis that was at odds with an hypothesis which had a great deal of supporting
evidence in the financial economics literature the efficient markets hypothesis. In particular, many
accounting researchers assumed that published accounting numbers are the only source of information
on a firm. Hence, they assumed managers could adopt an accounting procedure which increased
earnings but didn't affect cash flows (for example, a switchback to straight-line depreciation for
reporting) and increase stock prices. In essence, share prices would react mechanistically to published
earnings. The essence of the Efficient Markets Hypothesis is that there is competition for information in
the capital markets and information which is readily available to a large number of people (such as a
change in depreciation methods) which would be recognized and impounded in the firm's share price.
Hence, in assessing a firm's earnings the stock market would discount the effects of any change in
depreciation methods if it were announced. If it weren't announced the market would make a prediction
as to the likelihood the firm had changed and its estimate, on average, would be correct.
The efficient markets hypothesis and the mechanistic hypothesis are competing hypotheses about the
reaction of stock prices to accounting earnings. Since they give different predictions for those reactions,
under the oral tradition the expected procedure for Ball and Brown to follow would be to test which
reaction is consistent with the evidence, to discriminate among the theories. But, they didn't do this.
Instead, they examined the stock price reaction to earnings announcements and interpreted the results
assuming the Efficient Markets Hypothesis was correct. They learned that changes in earnings and stock
prices were highly associated, that much of the stock price change occurred before the announcement
and the rest at the time of the earnings announcement, but they didn't discriminate between the
hypotheses.
One can speculate why Ball and Brown did not attempt to discriminate. With hindsight, it appears
obvious that they should have tried. However, the paper was partially inspired by a paper in finance by
Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll (1969) which used a new event methodology to look at the stock price
effect of stock dividends. In their haste to introduce the new methodology into accounting, Ball and
Brown may have overlooked the step of discriminating between the competing hypotheses.
While Ball and Brown did not discriminate between the competing hypotheses they did follow a rule
which is important in first investigations of an area-start with simple aggregate models and look for
large aggregate relationships first. Additional complexity increases the number of assumptions
necessary and the likelihood of introducing assumptions which are not descriptive. Under the Efficient
Markets Hypothesis the market reacts to unexpected earnings on the announcement date. Hence, Ball
and Brown required a model for the market's expectation of earnings. They chose a very simple model -
- the earnings are expected to be the same as the earnings of last year. With hindsight we know that is a
very good model for predicting earnings, and had they chose a more complex model they might not
have observed the expected relationship between earnings and stock price. (4)
Attempts to remedy the failure of Ball and Brown to attempt to discriminate between the mechanistic
and Efficient Markets hypotheses were eventually forthcoming in 1972 in the studies of Ball and
Kaplan and Roll. These were followed by a whole spate of studies of the stock price effects of changes
in accounting techniques.
b) Studies of changes in accounting procedures
Ball and Kaplan and Roll attempted tests which would directly discriminate between the mechanistic
and Efficient Markets hypotheses. The basic proposition was that changes in accounting procedures
such as switchbacks to accelerated depreciation for reporting purposes do not affect cash flows and
therefore under the Efficient Market Hypothesis should not affect stock prices on average. Under the
mechanistic hypothesis such changes would affect stock prices in the direction the change affected
earnings. If it increased earnings stock prices should rise, if it decreased earnings stock prices should
fall.
Despite their conclusions to the contrary, the Ball and Kaplan and Roll studies did not distinguish
between the two hypotheses. The studies have too many methodological problems (see Watts and
Zimmerman, 1983) for us to discuss here, but one important defect is related to what is called an "ex
post selection bias." Both studies found that firms which change procedures have on average been
performing poorly over a long period of time. By selecting firms which change, you select losers.
However, Ball's evidence indicated that firms which switch to LIFO have been superior stock price
performers in the year before the change. Later studies confirmed that LIFO switchers are also superior
earnings performers. Thus, in looking at the stock price effect of any particular type of procedure one
would want to adjust for the earnings announced at the same time. The early studies did not make that
adjustment.
These studies showed us that discriminating between the two hypotheses was not easy. It emphasized
that theories are not developed and tested in any one study. Patterns only begin to emerge from a series
of studies. Hopefully, each study learns from the studies which precede it. Ball and Kaplan and Roll
narrowed in on the discrimination among theories neglected by Ball and Brown. Later studies try to
remedy the lack of earnings control and problems which were indicated by the Ball and Kaplan and Roll
studies -- it is an iterative process. The journey has to begin with one small step and Ball and Brown
was that step.
The Ball and Kaplan and Roll studies and those which followed began to raise even more serious
questions about accounting. Those studies were aimed at discriminating between an hypothesis for
which there was considerable empirical support in the finance literature and an assumption of the "a
priori" accounting literature. In that sense, they served to eliminate non-descriptive hypotheses from
accounting theory. However, with that non-descriptive hypotheses they eliminated explanations for why
managers choose particular accounting procedures. As a result they left a vacuum, they did not provide
any explanation for the choice of accounting procedures. The finance theory underlying most of these
researchers' view of accounting was the capital asset pricing model. In that model information is
costlessly available to everyone and there are no costs of organizing firms or contracting, In short, there
is no role for accounting. Accounting is irrelevant.
The preceding conclusion is what practitioners, forced to confront the Efficient Markets Hypothesis
studies, regard as an implication of that hypothesis. It is not. It is the CAPM and the Modigliani and
Miller (1956) worlds which led to the interpretation that accounting procedures do not have cash flow
effects and therefore do not affect stock prices. The Efficient Markets Hypothesis is an hypothesis about
the level of competition in the capital markets and does not assume no cash flow effects for accounting
procedures.
For an accountant trained in the oral tradition the vacuum left by the assumptions of the change studies
was intolerable. Accounting and auditing existed for centuries before they were required by law.
Therefore under one of the most useful tautologies in science (the survival of the fittest -- see Jensen,
1983) it must have some benefits. Further, in examining Kaplan and Roll's changes we found whole
industries (paper and steel) changing depreciation methods in one year. Such systematic change
suggested some systematic benefit to the managers.
One alternative is that managers obtain some satisfaction out of changing accounting methods.
However, that seems unlikely and empirical work has taught us that explaining phenomena in terms of
individual's preferences is unlikely to produce predictive theories. The other alternative is that
accounting procedures have cash flow effects.
Fortunately, at the same time as accounting researchers were undergoing a search for cash flow effects
of accounting procedures, financial economists were engaged in a similar search. The Miller and
Modigliani papers had eliminated the fuzzy logic that had previously supported the notion of optimal
debt/equity ratios. But, financial economists still observed that debt/equity ratios varied systematically
across industries (e.g., utilities have much larger leverage ratios than computer software companies).
This led to the introduction of costs into the finance literature to explain optimal debt/equity ratios. The
first was the cost of bankruptcy. Then the costs of contracting were introduced. Together with taxes
these costs could explain cross-sectional variations in debt/equity ratios.
The introduction of the costs of contracting provided a potential explanation for changes in accounting
procedures and for there being stock price effects of those changes. They opened up the potential for a
theory of accounting in the absence of government regulation. They could not explain the SEC's ASR's
and Standards issued by the FASB. However, at the same time as these costs were introduced, the
interaction of the empirical evidence and the normative demand for prescriptions for regulatory
purposes was producing a fledgling theory to explain the effect of regulation on accounting practice.
c) The effect of the normative demand on accounting theory
Prior to Ball and Brown and the Efficient Markets Hypothesis, accounting researchers had justified the
regulation of disclosure in terms of the managers' monopoly over information on the firm, naive
investors, the claimed mechanical relationship between earnings and stock prices and other arguments
which failed under the Efficient Market Hypothesis. Leftwich (1981) gives a full explanation for the
failure of each of these arguments, but a notion of why they fail can be obtained by considering the
argument that the diversity of accounting procedures enables managers to mislead investors.
If the capital market has rational expectations, as implied by the Efficient Markets Hypothesis, its
assessment of the implications of each firm's accounting numbers for the value of the firm will on
average be correct. Hence, the investor can protect himself against the effects of diversity by holding a
portfolio of securities so the markets' errors in expectation will average out. The market price of
securities will adjust for the diversity of procedures and managers cannot systematically use that
diversity to mislead investors. If you want to protect the small investor, require him to hold a descriptive
portfolio rather than regulate disclosure.
The demand for theories to support regulation led to accounting researchers adopting arguments from
economics which are consistent with the Efficient Markets hypothesis. These arguments are market
failure arguments. A market failure exists when the quantity or quality of a good produced in a free
market differs from the supposed social optimum. The social optimum is defined in terms of some
social welfare function. Optimum is only attained if the price of good produced equals their social
marginal costs. Individuals will produce a good to the point where their own private marginal benefit
equals their private marginal cost. If private costs are less than social costs, too much will be produced
(overproduction) and if private benefits are less than social benefits, too little will be produced
(underproduction).
An example often used to demonstrate a market failure is that of the bee keeper and apple grower. A
bee keeper keeps his bees in a field adjacent to an apple orchard and the bees pollinate the apple
orchard. The bee keeper isn't paid for this pollination service so he makes his decision on how many
bees to keep and how much honey to produce ignoring the benefit of the pollination service. As a result
he under produces. Social benefits are larger than private benefits.
Two types of market failure arguments have been made in accounting, the public good argument and
the signalling (or speculation) argument. The public good argument is the bees argument. Information
in accounting reports provides benefits to investors other than the shareholders who pay for it. Those
other investors receive the benefit for free. They can read the information in the Wall Street Journal.
Because shareholders are not rewarded for the information produced for outsiders their marginal benefit
from the information is less than the benefits to society, hence there is an underproduction of
information.
The signalling problem involves situations where one party to a transaction has more information than
another. As a result an individual who has information that he is more productive or a manager who has
information that his firm is worth more than its current market value engages in costly underproductive
efforts to discriminate him or his firm. There is overproduction of information.
The presentation of these arguments led to further analysis in economics and it was perceived that once
contracting and information costs are considered it is not clear there is a market failure. For example,
consider the bees argument. Why doesn't the bee keeper charge the apple grower for the bees' service?
Presumably because it is too costly to write and enforce those contracts. Given those costs, regulation
can only improve welfare if the government can, through its regulations, achieve the same or higher
level of production more cheaply. The question becomes one of relative costs of government and
private actions. "A priori" it is not clear that government action is cheaper.
Disillusionment with these new rationales for regulation led economists to ask whether in practice
regulation was designed to remedy market failure. They looked at the regulation of such industries as
the taxi cab industry and found that regulation was very difficult to explain in terms of a market failure.
What was the market failure in taxi cabs? These questions led economists to consider the government
not as one person, but as a set of interactions among individuals who are all motivated by self-interest.
Politicians are considered to be no different from businessmen in that they also maximize their utility.
Politics itself is viewed as a competition for the use of the coercive power of the government to
maximize self-interest.
The disillusionment with the view of government as an individual interested in remedying market
failures and maximizing social welfare and the alternative view of government as a competition among
individuals has been adopted by some accountants who have begun to use it to try to predict and explain
accounting practice to the extent it is affected by regulation. In that view of the political process,
information costs enable accounting procedures and standards to affect the outcome of the competition
for the use of the coercive power to transfer wealth. As a consequence, accounting procedures can affect
a firm's cash flows.
a) Summary of the evolution of empirical research in accounting
From the preceding we observe the influence of financial economics and industrial economics on the
development of accounting research. The empirical work in accounting which followed from the
development of the Efficient Markets Hypothesis and the CAPM in finance led to the discarding of old
theories about the relationship between accounting procedures and stock prices. However, the CAPM
world left no place for accounting.
Fortunately, at the same time, financial economists realized that the CAPM and the Miller/Modigliani
world (even with taxes) gave no explanation for systematic variations in debt/equity ratios and other
financial policies. They introduced the costs of contracting as a factor which, with taxes, could explain
those variables.
Contracting costs also enable accounting procedures to have cash flow effects and therefore could also
explain cross-sectional variables in accounting practice and why firms and industries change accounting
procedures. As a consequence, accountants eagerly adopted contracting costs as an explanation for
accounting; as a building block in an accounting theory. As we shall see that role for accounting is
essentially the old stewardship function which was given prime place in early accounting texts.
At the same time as the contracting explanation for accounting was being developed, developments in
the economic analysis of government regulation were also producing a means by which accounting
could affect cash flows (i.e., via its effects on government regulation). Accountants also adopted this
potential explanation for the choice of accounting procedures.
4. A VERY BRIEF OUTLINE OF THE ACCOUNTING THEORY BUILT ON CONTRACTING
AND POLITICAL COSTS
a) Contracting
In the last five years much research has gone into development of a theory of accounting based on
contracting costs. This research has taken two major complementary directions. One is a mathematical
modelling approach, the other is an empirical approach. Because of the limited time and my relative
abilities I shall summarize only the empirical approach.
Under this approach there is no such thing as a firm. Instead it is a collection of contracts between
various parties, shareholders, bondholders, managers, employees, suppliers, customers, etc. By working
together the parties can increase the size of the pie to be split amongst them. However, the individual
parties can also take opportunistic actions which are designed to increase their share of the pie at the
expense of the size itself. The contracts between the parties are designed to encourage value increasing
actions and discourage opportunistic actions.
The contracts do not emerge by accident. In capital markets characterized by rational expectations, on
average the price of share of a newly floated firm will reflect the opportunistic actions the market
expects the promoter/manager to take after the firm goes public. Hence, the promoter bears the effect of
those actions on the value of the firm in a reduced selling price for the shares. This encourages him to
write contracts which restrict those actions. The contracts take the form of the corporate by-laws,
incentive compensation schemes, etc. Likewise bondholders will be price protected and this will
encourage managers to write debt contracts which also restrict their actions. In general, the losses which
occur by opportunistic actions encourage all parties to try to contract to restrict those actions.
Contracts will not be expected to be effective unless they are monitored and enforced. Herein enters
accounting and auditing. Accounting numbers are used to restrict actions in by-laws and debt contracts
and are used to encourage the manager to maximize the value of the firm in compensation plans.
Different accounting procedures can be optimal for different firms. To illustrate this consider a sand
mining firm I audited in Australia. That firm prepared weekly financial statements based on the
recognition of profit at production. To avoid problems with the auditors they would have a ship load all
their inventories at the end of the fiscal year so that the production basis produced the same net income
as the sale basis. When I asked the controller why they used the production basis he pointed out that
they had contracted with DuPont for the sale of all of their production of their main product, titanium
dioxide, for several years into the future at the prevailing world price. The major variables the managers
could control were the level and cost of production. So as a result they had a bonus scheme based on
profits recognized at production which went all the way down to the foremen. The controller's argument
is sensible, but imagine what would happen if we implemented recognition of profit at production and a
bonus scheme in a normal manufacturing firm. The manager would have every incentive to produce for
inventory and no incentive to sell. The results would be disastrous.
From the preceding example you can see that a change in an accounting procedure could potentially
affect the value of the firm; the size of the pie. Changes in accounting procedures can also affect the
size of the pie, the share of one part to the firm. For example, a manager could change accounting
procedures and increase the size of his bonus which depends on accounting numbers, if the
compensation committee of the board of directors does not always adjust bonuses for changes in
accounting techniques. If the manager is successful his wealth is increased and the shareholders'
reduced.
The preceding examples only provide a small extremely simplified glimpse of the volume of analysis
underlying the contracting effects of accounting procedures, but they should be sufficient to explain
how accounting procedures can have cash flows or wealth effects.
b) Political Process
The analysis of the political process is not as well developed as that of the contracting process.
However, as the contracting effects of accounting procedures depend on the costs of contracting,
information and monitoring, the political effects of accounting procedures depend on the costs of
forming coalitions and costs of information in the political process. The basic proposition is that the
incentive to gather information in the political process is less than in the market process, so that those
costs become very important. To illustrate this point consider a firm whose management is inefficient.
Individuals in the market have incentives to invest in gathering such information because they can, by
buying shares of the firm, assuming control and changing the management's policies, capture the gain
from elimination of the inefficiencies. Those individuals could be wealthy individual entrepreneurs
(e.g., the Pritzkers) or managers of corporations whose compensation is highly dependent on their
corporation's share price (e.g., by options).
Now consider an inefficiency in government. For convenience assume that the City of Rochester
provides a garbage collection service which has a market value of $750,000 but the service costs the
city and the city charges the taxpayers $1 million for the service (ignore any tax deductibility). There is
an inefficiency of $250,000 a year, the present value of which will be impounded in the market value of
land in the city. Can any individual gain the present value of the $250,000 by discovering the
inefficiency? No! To capture that value the individual would have to buy all the land in Rochester (to
capture the increase in value when rates are reduced), then bribe enough voters to have the garbage
service and the $1 million charges eliminated. The relative cost of performing that feat is prohibitive.
Consequently, individuals will not invest as much in learning of these inefficiencies as in learning of
undervalued corporations. The incentives are not as great. If we extend the problem to the State and
Federal government the likelihood of individuals being able to capture the benefit of eliminating
inefficiencies is even smaller and the incentives poorer.
Of course while taxpayers may not be informed of the benefits from eliminating the garbage service
because it doesn't pay them individually, the union of municipal employees who run the garbage trucks
will be informed as to the costs to them of the service being eliminated. The relative amount they stand
to gain per person by being informed is more and because the union is already organized the marginal
cost of acquiring information and lobbying is much less. Hence, any politician considering making the
inefficient garbage collection an issue stands to lose the votes of the municipal employees without
gaining many votes from taxpayers (who rationally discount his story).
Given these information costs, accounting can play an important role in the political process. It is used
in many situations to regulate price (e.g., utilities). Further, reported profits affect the likelihood of
costly government regulations and taxes being passed. As a consequence, changes in accounting
procedures and standards can affect a firm's cash flows.
As an example, consider the release of the third quarter profits of oil companies in 1979. At the time of
the release of Exxon's profits the House had decontrolled the pump price of gas. After the report of a
200 percent increase in Exxon's profit over the third quarter of 1978, profits which the media labelled
"pornographic," controls were reimposed on the pump price.
An explanation of the article in Barron's on October 29, 1979, suggests that much of the increase in
Exxon's profits was due to accounting standards rather than changes in Exxon's cash flows. In July of
1979 the FASB (in FASB Statement No. 31) had ruled that certain deferred taxes on oil inventories
forgiven by the British government had to be brought into the third quarter earnings of the oil firms. The
present value of these deferred taxes was undoubtedly much less than their book value. In addition, part
of the third quarter profits were due to exchange gains under FASB Statement No. 8.
Exxon did not try to explain to the voters that much of their profits were just book despite the effect of
the profits on government action. The individual voter has little incentive to be informed and as we all
know the cost of understanding FASB statements is large to accountants let alone a layman.
The preceding example gives an idea of the way accounting procedures and standards can affect cash
flows via the political process. It is a simple caricature and does not capture the full subtlety of the
arguments, but it does convey the primary idea.
5. EMPIRICAL REGULARITIES FOUND IN TESTING THE CONTRACTING AND
POLITICAL COST THEORIES OF ACCOUNTING
Under some very strong simplifying assumptions testable propositions or hypotheses have been derived
from the theory of accounting outlined above. Two of those hypotheses have been consistently
confirmed by empirical studies (see Watts and Zimmerman, 1983, Chapter 11).
The first of those is the one mentioned in the beginning of the talk, the higher the firm's debt/equity
ratio the more likely the firm is to choose accounting procedures which increase the present value of
reported earnings. This association is predicted on the basis of debt contracts. Basically firms with
higher leverage have incentives to be closer to the constraints in the debt agreements, including the
constraint on leverage and are therefore more likely to have to use earnings increasing procedures to
avoid default.
The second hypothesis which has been consistently confirmed is that the larger the firm the more likely
the firm is to use and lobby for accounting procedures which reduce the present value of reported
earnings. This association is predicted on the basis of the proposition that large firms are more
susceptible to wealth transfers in the political process and therefore have a greater incentive to reduce
reported profits to reduce attention from the media. There is a threshold effect in this result (i.e., only
firms above a certain large size level exhibit the tendency). In addition the results suggest that the
association is primarily driven by the oil industry (see Watts and Zimmerman, 1983, Chapter 11).
Another hypothesis for which there is some supporting evidence is that managers influence the firm's
net accruals (the difference between net income and operating cash flows) in a manner consistent with
them maximizing the present value of their bonuses (Healy, 1982).
Empirical research testing these hypotheses is in the early stages and is relatively crude. It is possible
that the associations found are the result of forces other than those hypothesized. However, the
observation of empirical regularities in accounting procedures so early in the literature's history does
suggest that the research will be very productive.
6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The history of the evolution of economics-based empirical research that I have related to you is very
selective. I concentrated on a very narrow group of the empirical studies applying financial economics
to accounting following the Ball and Brown paper. There have been several other avenues of research
apart from the stock price effects of changes in accounting techniques including large literatures on the
time series of accounting numbers, on the prediction of financial distress, on the association between
accounting numbers and measures of risk and on the information content of earnings, among others.
The narrow concentration has been a deliberate attempt to focus on how the research has evolved, how
the conclusions are based on aggregate data rather than single observations, and on the studies in
general rather than one study, how one study builds on another and how accounting follows the trends
in economics, particularly financial economics.
My intention has been to give a "feeling" for the research process to those involved in the process and to
give the beginnings of an understanding of the process to practitioners. I hope I have had some success.
FOOTNOTES
(1) The absence of practitioners from the Chicago Conference in 1982 was partially due to the nature of
the topic, but the decline in the number of practitioners appearing at the influential Chicago Conference
is well documented by Dyckman and Zeff.
(2) Oscar Gellein, a retired FASB member, recently wrote "standard setters and auditors, despite
considerable efforts, on the part of some at least, to understand the results, have not been able to reach a
level of understanding sufficient to establish confidence in the results... They wonder because they do
not understand. They do not understand partly because what they read is not geared to their training and
experience.... This is a plea, however, for attention by EMH researchers to ways of communicating with
lay parties who are very much interested in the research." (Gellein, 1981, p, 49)
(3) Note Gellein's plea in fn. 1, above.
(4) The lack of association Benston (1967) found between earnings announcements and stock price
changes can be partially attributed to overly complex earnings expectation models. Ball and Brown did
have some evidence of the predictive ability of this model from the evidence in Brown and Ball (1967).
